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Introduction 
 
Voters in Ecuador face a clear choice on November 26 in the second and final 
round of the presidential election. On one side is the billionaire banana magnate 
Alvaro Noboa, the country’s richest man, who favors a continuation of current 
economic policies and further economic integration with the United States; on the 
other side is Rafael Correa, a left-of-center economist who promises to break with 
the policies of the IMF and World Bank, and opposes a new commercial treaty with 
the United States. 
 
In addition to the polarized programs of the candidates, there is a crisis of legitimacy 
of the political system. The country has had eight presidents in the last 10 years. The 
traditional political parties are marginalized from this presidential election. Noboa 
created his own party in 2002 – the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action 
(Partido Renovador Institucional de Accion Nacional or PRIAN) and Correa is 
running with the newly formed party Alianza PAIS— Proud and Sovereign Nation 
Alliance (Patria Altiva I Soberana) but without any Congressional candidates: he 
proposes to create a constitutional assembly to rewrite the constitution and reform 
existing political institutions, which are viewed by many as corrupt and inept. Recent 
polls1 show a tight race for the runoff election on Sunday November 26. 
 
Economic issues, including trade, economic relations with the United States and 
multilateral institutions, and future economic stability have played a role in this 
electoral campaign. This paper looks at Ecuador’s economy and some of the 
economic issues that are relevant to the election. 
 
Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director, and Luis Sandoval and Belén Cadena are Research Assistants at the Center for 
Economic and Policy Research. The authors would like to thank Rozina Ali, Kathryn Bogel and David 
Rosnick for research and editing assistance.
                                                 
1 For example, Cedatos-Gallup poll conducted Nov.11-13 showed a statistical tie (for a summary of polls on Ecuador, 
see http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/searchSimpleResults/iw/1/keyword/correa%20and%20 
noboa). 
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Ecuador’s Long-Term Economic Growth Failure: the Country’s Biggest 
Economic Problem 
 
The growth of GDP per capita2 in Ecuador over the last 25 years has been negative. Figure 1 shows 
the collapse of economic growth over the 1980-2000 period: GDP per capita actually fell by 14 
percent. This is a disastrous economic failure, about equal to what happened to Africa during this 
period. It is also worth comparing it to the 1960-1980 period, when Ecuador’s economy grew by 110 
percent per capita. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Percent Growth in Real Per-Capita GDP in Ecuador 
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It is important to recognize that the economic growth failure of the last 25 years, and not any 
changes in the distribution of income, is responsible for the high levels of poverty that Ecuador 
suffers from today. If the economy had simply continued to grow at its pre-1980 rate, the country 
would have average living standards comparable to Chile. Also, Ecuador’s pre-1980 growth rate was 
not unusually high for a developing country – South Korea grew about twice as fast and Taiwan 
nearly three times as fast during this period. So the 1960-1980 period provides a reasonable 
benchmark to compare the last 25 years, as well as for future growth targets. 
 
                                                 
2 Per capita GDP is used here because it is a better indicator of the change in the country’s average living standards than 
GDP; if GDP grows only because of population growth, then the population as a whole is not necessarily better off. All 
numbers here are real – adjusted for inflation.  
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As a result of this growth failure, Ecuador’s income per person is only $5,3923 today. It is also much 
more difficult, and often politically impossible, to improve the distribution of income in the absence 
of economic growth. When the economy is not growing, it means that any gains for the poor must 
be directly at the expense of the middle and upper classes. 
 
Ecuador’s growth failure mirrors what happened in the region: Latin America’s regional per capita 
GDP grew by 82 percent per capita from 1960-1980, but only 13 percent in the (longer) period from 
1980-2005. This is the worst 25-year economic performance in the region for more than a century. 
Rafael Correa, who received his Ph.D in economics from the University of Illinois in Urbana, is the 
eleventh in a series of left-populist presidential candidates in the last eight years in Latin America 
who have campaigned against the “neoliberal” economic policies of this period, as they are 
commonly known in the region. Seven of these candidates won4, and the other three (Costa Rica, 
Peru, Mexico) have come close to winning. 
 
In the most recent period, since 2000, Ecuador has done better than the regional average, growing 
by a total of 8 percent5 per capita for the years 2000-2005, and an additional 3 percent expected for 
this year. This has not, however, been sufficient to stem voter discontent with the government, and 
as noted, the established political institutions and parties remain discredited. There are several 
reasons that the improvement in economic performance does not seem to have stabilized the 
country’s politics. 
 
First, the economic growth since 2000 has not been enough to make up for the decline in per capita 
income over the preceding two decades. So the average person is still worse off than they were 25 
years ago, in terms of per capita income.  
 
Second, the government has cut social spending drastically since 1993. This is shown in Table 1. As 
a percentage of GDP, it fell from a high of almost 9 percent of GDP in 1993 to 4 percent in 2000. 
Since 2000 it went back up to 6.6 percent of GDP in 20046, but even in real spending per person it 
remains below its 1993 levels. 
 
Third, poverty is widespread and unevenly distributed geographically, and is concentrated among the 
indigenous population. The poverty rate for the entire population reached 45 percent in 20017, 
having climbed up by a third since 1995.8 For indigenous people, the rate is 87 percent, and 96 
percent for those living in the rural highlands. Social indicators also vary dramatically by ethnicity 
and geography. Indigenous Ecuadorians (age 30-34) have 6.9 years of formal education, as 
compared to 9.6 years for the rest of the population. For non-indigenous children ages five to 
                                                 
3 This is a purchasing power parity (PPP) measure, which adjusts for international price differences and is generally 
better for international comparisons; in current dollars, per capita GDP is $2760. 
4 These were Néstor Kirchner of Argentina (2003), Lula da Silva of Brazil (2002 ), Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador (2002), 
Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay (2005), and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1998 and 2000), and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua 
(2006)  
5 There are some differences between different data sets, and IMF WEO (September 2006) data puts the increase at 23 
percent per capita (PPP). The Penn World Tables are used as the main data source here because it has a consistent data 
set from 1960-2004. 
6 Latest numbers available. 
7 World Bank (2004), "La Pobreza en el Ecuador. Evaluacion y Agenda de Politicas," Washington, DC. Available online 
at: http://www.mef.gov.ec/docs/Presentacion,%20La%20pobreza%20en%20Ecuador%20(BM).pdf 
8 Address by Stanley Fischer, “Ecuador and the IMF”, Hoover Institution Conference on Currency Unions on May 19, 
2000: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/051900.htm#P9_23. 
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TABLE 1
Ecuador: Social Spending, 1990-2004
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Social spending per capita
(in constant 2000 US$)
Total 100 90 97 115 79 82 82 67 72 55 50 77 74 78 92
Education 38 33 33 46 33 37 38 30 36 28 22 30 38 33 40
Health 18 18 22 20 9 13 12 10 11 9 8 12 14 15 17
Social Security 43 39 42 48 30 28 30 24 23 18 18 27 19 27 32
Housing 0 0 0 1 7 4 2 3 3 1 2 8 3 3 3
Total social spending
(in % of GDP)
Total 8.0 7.0 7.4 8.9 5.9 6.2 6.2 4.9 5.3 4.4 4.0 5.9 5.6 5.9 6.6
Education 3.0 2.6 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.2 2.7 2.2 1.8 2.3 2.9 2.5 2.8
Health 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2
Social Security 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.7 2.2 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.4 2.0 2.3
Housing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total social spending as % of total public spending
Total 43.9 41.7 43.5 53.5 38.3 29.2 31.6 23.6 26.3 17.1 19.0 22.7 24.6 25.8 27.3
Education 16.8 15.3 14.7 21.4 16.1 13.1 14.6 10.6 13.3 8.7 8.5 9.0 12.6 10.9 11.7
Health 8.1 8.2 10.0 9.3 4.4 4.5 4.7 3.7 3.8 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.7 5.0 5.1
Social Security 19.0 18.0 18.7 22.3 14.3 9.9 11.4 8.3 8.2 5.5 6.7 7.9 6.3 9.0 9.5
Housing 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.4 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.6 2.5 1.0 0.9 1.0
Fiscal Balance (Non Financial Public Sector)
(in % of GDP)
Overall 0.5 -0.6 -1.1 -0.6 -0.2 -1.3 -2.8 -2.1 -5.2 -4.9 1.4 0.0 0.8 1.7 2.3
Primary 6.9 5.3 3.6 3.6 3.4 2.6 1.1 2.1 -1.0 2.2 8.0 4.7 4.3 4.7 4.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribbean (ECLAC)
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eighteen, 73 percent attended school and did not work; for indigenous children it is 57 percent, with 
28 percent working and a third not attending school at all. Child mortality among indigenous people 
is twice the rate of non-indigenous children, and child malnutrition is 59 percent, compared to 26 
percent for non-indigenous.9
 
The organization and demands of indigenous groups to overcome their social and political exclusion 
has been a regional phenomenon – the election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president of 
Bolivia last December being the most prominent example. As a result of these factors and other 
political changes sweeping the region, as well as the widely perceived corruption of elected and 
appointed officials, the economic growth of the last few years in Ecuador has not been enough to 
restore confidence in the political system. 
 
Economic Crisis in Ecuador: Could the 1990’s Crisis Be Repeated? 
 
As in almost every Latin American election in recent years where a left-of-center candidate has 
challenged the economic and political status quo, fears of economic crisis have been part of the 
campaign against the left candidate. Perhaps the most famous example was the Brazilian presidential 
election of 2002, where a financial crisis erupted during the campaign when leftist Lula Da Silva of 
the Workers’ Party pulled ahead in the polls. But the markets soon calmed after the election, and 
fears of economic crises upon the election of left candidates in recent years have generally proven to 
be without foundation. 
 
Nonetheless, memories of the 1998-2000 economic crisis in Ecuador, one of the worst in the 
country’s history, are still fresh. And candidate Rafael Correa has been criticized for his statements 
about renegotiating the country’s debt, as well as his disputes with the World Bank and IMF. So the 
issue of economic stability in the event of a left victory is one that may play a role in this election.10
 
In Ecuador, the economic situation today is very different from that of the late 1990s, and therefore 
an economic crisis is unlikely, regardless of who wins the November 26 election. The late 1990s 
crisis was primarily a result of external factors that are not present today and are not likely to be 
repeated in the near future. As happened with other countries in Latin America, Ecuador attracted a 
lot of foreign capital and experienced a credit boom between 1993 and 1995, but this was reversed 
with the “Tequila crisis” in Mexico in 1995. The Mexican peso crisis, and the outflow of capital that 
occurred there and elsewhere, was mainly the result of an increase in U.S. short-term interest rates 
(from 3 to 6 percent for 1994-1995), which drew capital out of Mexico and other countries. The 
monetary authorities in Ecuador responded to the peso crisis by raising interest rates above 50 
percent in 1995 (almost 30 percent real interest rates) and thereby keeping the currency from 
crashing. Growth fell to 1.7 percent for 1995 and the financial system was strained. The conflict 
with Peru in 1995 brought additional economic stress.  
 
                                                 
9 World Bank, “Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development in Latin America: 1994-2004;” May 18, 2005. 
10 This issue may resurface prominently in the remaining days of the campaign. “ ‘We would expect Noboa to re-
instigate the `fear factor' against Correa, moving away from personal attacks and focusing more on the threats of his 
policies for the country's stability,’ wrote Marjorie Hernandez, a Latin America debt analyst with HSBC Securities Inc. in 
New York, in a report today.” (Lester Pimental and Helen Murphy, “Ecuador’s Bonds Fall on Correa’s Restructure 
Pledge, Oil Prices,” Bloomberg: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=alieIPPMcNP0&refer=latin_america 
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Ecuador’s economy managed to make it through the Asian financial crisis that began in August 
1997, but suffered from other major shocks that occurred at the same time: the floods from El Nino 
caused enormous economic damage in late 1997 and 1998, with estimates of crop and infrastructure 
damage as high as 13 percent of GDP.11 But the Asian financial crisis spread, first to Russia and then 
to Brazil and Argentina, and Ecuador was dragged down with it. Like Argentina, Ecuador faced 
increasing interest costs, which also drove up the current account. 
 
This is shown in Figure 2. Interest payments increased from 4.2 percent of GDP in 1998 to 7.1 
percent in 1999. The current account deficit peaked at 9.3 percent of GDP in 1998 (most of the 
public debt was dollar-denominated). The government responded by continuing to cut social 
spending: by 2000 it was just 43 percent of its real 1993 levels, but this did not stem the crisis. The 
economy was also hit by the collapse of oil prices in 1998, which cut government revenue by 14 
percent.12 The currency collapsed, which put increasing stress on a highly de facto dollarized financial 
system (where many receipts were in sucres but payments in dollars). The result was a severe 
economic crisis, with GDP declining by 6.3 percent in 1999, and inflation reaching 96 percent in 
2000. There were freezes on bank deposits, financial institutions closed, and employment 
plummeted, prompting the largest wave of emigration in Ecuador’s history.13 The crisis also led to a 
default on the public debt in 1999. 
 
The question with regard to this election is whether the economy remains vulnerable to crisis in the 
event that, for example, the policies or president of a new government are not favored by the 
financial sector, either nationally or internationally. This seems very unlikely. The late 1990s crisis 
was a result of a set of external shocks, combined with weaknesses in the country’s financial system. 
While such external shocks – e.g., rapidly rising interest payments due to crises in the international 
financial system – are possible (although not likely), they would not be brought on by the election in 
Ecuador. The same is true for the 1995 El Nino and the collapse of oil prices – anything is possible, 
but again such external events are not related to electoral or policy choices. Most importantly, the 
most dangerous weakness associated with the late 1990s crisis – the vulnerability of the banking 
system to a run on the country’s currency – has been resolved. Dollarization has eliminated the risk 
of holding the national currency, and therefore has most likely made crises of the type that the 
country experienced in the late 1990s a thing of the past. 
  
Dollarization and Recovery 
 
Ecuador adopted the dollar as its national currency in 2000. There are advantages and disadvantages, 
including risks, for a country giving up its national currency for the dollar. The main advantage is the 
relative stability of the dollar. Ecuador had high inflation prior to dollarization, averaging more than 
40 percent over the years 1983-1999. Perhaps equally important, the country had a high level of de 
facto dollarization: by 1999 this had reached about 45 percent of country deposits and two-thirds of 
all (including off-shore) deposits.14 This level of de facto dollarization makes the financial system 
particularly vulnerable to crises. Businesses whose revenue is in sucres but payments are in dollars, for  
                                                 
11 Stanley Fischer, “Ecuador and the IMF,” May 2000. 
12 Banco Central de Ecuador. 
13 Jacome, Luis I. “The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador: Institutional Weaknesses, Fiscal Rigidities, and Financial 
Dollarization at Work,” International Monetary Fund, January 2004: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0412.pdf, p. 5. 
14 “Ecuador: Selected Issues,” International Monetary Fund, March 2006: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06103.pdf; and Jacome, January 2004. 
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FIGURE 2 
Ecuador: Public Sector Current Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 
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example, can get hit hard when the currency drops; and the fear of further declines in the domestic 
currency can lead to a flight to dollars and instability in the banking system. These problems were a 
big part of the 1999 crisis.  
 
Dollarization gets rid of these risks, and this has been an important success of that policy. It had also 
helped enormously to bring down inflation from 96 percent in 2000 to 3.3 percent today. On the 
other side of the equation, one of the disadvantages of dollarization is that the country loses control 
over monetary and exchange rate policy, and therefore does not have these instruments available to 
adjust to external shocks or imbalances. If the country runs a trade deficit, for example, the 
exchange rate cannot adjust in order to bring this into balance. If there is a fall in oil prices or other 
external shocks, the government cannot use monetary policy or exchange rate policy to help 
stimulate the economy. If the dollar is overvalued, Ecuador’s exports and import-competing 
industries would suffer. And adopting a foreign currency also severely limits the Central Bank’s 
capacity for acting as a lender of last resort for the financial system. 
 
Despite these potential risks and disadvantages, dollarization appears to have worked pretty well for 
Ecuador so far. The main potential weakness has been a possible overvaluation of the country’s 
exchange rate, since the dollar is generally overvalued and the government cannot affect its exchange 
rate. Figure 3  shows  Ecuador’s  real  effective  exchange  rate,  against  a  trade-weighted  basket  of 
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FIGURE 3 
Ecuador: Real Effective Exchange Rate (Index) 
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currencies. As can be seen, it increased by 139 percent after the dollar was adopted in 2000; it has 
since retreated by only 11 percent. 
 
Ecuador’s trade balance can be seen in Table 2. There was a large trade surplus in 2000 (9.2 percent 
of GDP), but this was mainly due to a surge in oil revenue. The trade surplus reverted to deficit in 
the succeeding years and then to surpluses for 2004-2006; but again this is overwhelmingly due to 
the behavior of oil revenues, which account for about 75 percent of export earnings. 
 
If we look at non-oil exports, which are more likely to be affected by the country’s exchange rate, 
there is a large drop from 17.8 percent of GDP in 1999 (the last year before dollarization) to 10.6 
percent for 2006. This decline was confined to the traditional export sector; non-traditional exports 
(including flowers and canned fish, the two largest non-traditional exports) have actually increased 
over the period. The traditional sector, including bananas, was hard hit by the effects of El Nino; 
and shrimp exports suffered from an outbreak of white spot disease in 1998-2000 from which they 
have yet to recover, remaining at 5 percent of total exports today as compared to 14 percent in 1999. 
 
So the effects of dollarization on Ecuador’s exports are not easy to gauge. Since the dollar is 
generally overvalued internationally, and given the huge rise in the country’s real effective exchange 
rate since dollarization, it is very likely that dollarization has lowered Ecuador’s export earnings, 
economic growth, and potential GDP relative to what these would be with a national currency that 
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TABLE 2
Ecuador: Main Economic Indicators, 1997-2005
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP, total 4.1 2.1 -6.3 2.8 5.3 4.2 3.6 7.9 4.7
Oil sector -2.1 -1.9 -8.9 0.9 1.1 -4.4 6.7 35.4 -3.4
Non-oil sector 5.1 2.8 -6.1 3.1 5.5 3.9 3.5 3.6 5.8
Real GDP per capita 2.0 0.1 -8.1 0.9 9.6 0.1 2.1 6.4 3.3
GDP expenditure-based
Consumption 4.3 3.6 -6.8 3.9 5.8 6.3 4.7 4.5 6.1
         General government 4.7 -2.2 -5.5 4.7 -0.6 4.3 1.4 3.6 3.4
         Households 4.2 4.5 -7.0 3.8 6.8 6.6 5.2 4.6 6.4
Investment (Gross capital formation) 12.5 14.2 -49.4 29.0 45.0 21.6 -14.8 12.0 10.0
Exports of goods and services 7.8 -5.1 7.8 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 9.6 15.8 7.4
Imports of goods and services 15.4 7.0 -29.5 15.8 24.8 16.7 -3.9 11.1 13.5
External Sector
Current account balance -1.8 -8.6 5.3 5.8 -2.9 -5.1 -1.5 -1.7 -0.2
Trade Balance 2.5 -4.3 10.0 9.2 -1.4 -3.9 -0.1 0.5 1.5
  Exports, FOB 22.3 18.1 26.7 30.9 22.0 20.2 21.7 23.8 27.7
    Oil 6.6 4.0 8.9 15.3 8.9 8.3 9.1 13.0 16.1
    Non-oil 15.7 14.1 17.8 15.6 13.1 12.0 12.6 10.8 11.6
  Imports, FOB 19.7 22.4 16.7 21.8 23.4 24.1 21.8 23.2 26.2
    Oil 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2 0.9 2.6 3.0 4.7
    Non-oil 18.1 21.2 15.5 20.2 22.3 23.2 19.3 20.2 21.5
Total External Debt 63.5 69.8 95.4 82.9 67.7 65.2 58.5 52.7 47.2
Public 52.9 56.2 80.2 69.0 53.4 45.5 40.1 33.9 29.7
Private 10.7 13.6 15.2 14.0 14.3 19.7 18.4 18.8 17.5
(continued)
annual % change
% of GDP
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TABLE 2 (continued)
Ecuador: Main Economic Indicators, 1997-2005
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Fiscal Sector (1)
Total revenue 19.9 17.3 21.1 25.9 23.3 25.5 24.1 25.1 25.1
Oil 5.4 3.9 6.3 9.2 6.4 5.6 5.8 6.5 6.1
Non-oil (2) 14.6 13.4 14.8 16.7 17.0 20.0 18.3 18.6  
Total expenditure 22.1 22.1 25.0 24.4 23.3 24.7 23.0 23.0 24.3
Current 16.8 17.2 19.0 19.4 16.7 18.4 17.9 18.0 19.3
   Interest 4.2 4.2 7.1 6.6 4.7 3.4 2.9 2.4 2.2
      External 3.2 3.2 5.0 5.4 3.7 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.8
      Domestic 1.0 1.0 2.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
Capital 5.3 5.0 6.0 5.0 6.6 6.4 5.1 4.9 5.0
Overall balance -2.1 -4.8 -3.9 1.5 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.1 0.7
Primary balance 2.1 -0.6 3.2 8.1 4.7 4.2 4.4 4.5 2.9
Non-oil balance -7.5 -8.7 -10.2 -7.7 -6.3 -4.8 -4.2 -4.4 -5.3
Total Public Debt 59.9 66.6 98.3 86.7 66.5 56.7 50.6 44.6 39.8
External 52.9 56.2 80.2 69.0 53.4 45.5 40.1 33.9 29.7
Domestic 7.0 10.5 18.1 17.8 13.2 11.1 10.5 10.7 10.1
Additional Items
23.6 23.3 16.7 15.9 21.2 24.9 28.6 32.6 36.5
1,980.1 1,910.1 1,343.5 1,260.0 1,748.0 1,966.7 2,229.8 2,505.3 2,761.2
3,381.9 3,423.6 3,192.3 3,291.0 3,684.4 3,720.3 3,844.4 4,158.0 4,316.2
21.5 25.3 14.7 20.1 24.3 26.5 21.5 23.4 24.3
30.6 36.1 52.2 96.1 37.7 12.6 7.9 2.7 2.1
11.9 12.2 12.4 12.6 12.2 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.2
Sources: Banco Central del Ecuador (BCE); International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO), September 2006
Notes: (1) refers to the non-financial public sector (NFPS)
(2) Includes taxes, contributions to social security, revenue generated by state enterprises and other sources
Investment, % of GDP (gross capital 
formation)
Inflation, average (annual % change)
Population (in millions)
% of GDP
GDP, current (in billions of US$)
GDP per capita (in current US$)
GDP per capita PPP (in current US$)
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was stable and more competitive. On the other hand, the government was not able to maintain a 
stable exchange rate prior to dollarization, and the effects of this instability on the macroeconomy 
were not manageable. On the positive side looking forward, it is likely that the dollar will depreciate 
in the future, since the United States cannot continue running current account deficits of more than 
6.6 percent of GDP indefinitely.15  
 
Neither candidate in the run-off election has suggested reversing the country’s adoption of the dollar 
as its national currency. 
 
With regard to other macroeconomic conditions, the next president will inherit an economy that has 
improved steadily since 2000, and is more stable than it has been in decades. According to Central 
Bank data for the first half of 2006, there is a trade surplus of 1.4 percent of GDP, and a current 
account balance of 1.1 percent. The central government budget is also running surplus of 1.7 
percent of GDP. Consumer price inflation is at an extraordinarily low 3.3 percent annual rate. While 
these macroeconomic indicators are sound, perhaps the main vulnerability is that the government’s 
fiscal balance would suffer from a significant and sustained decline in oil prices. Oil export revenue 
is about 7 percent of GDP; thus a 28 percent decline in oil prices, for example, would shift the fiscal 
balance downward by about 2 percent of GDP.   
 
International Trade and Finance, and U.S.-Ecuador Relations 
 
One of the significant differences between the two candidates is their positions regarding 
international trade and finance, and relations with the United States. Noboa is a staunch ally of the 
United States government, and supports its foreign and commercial policy in the region. He has 
promised to cut diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Cuba if he is elected, and to sign a 
proposed Free Trade Agreement with the United States.  
 
By contrast, Correa has taken a more skeptical approach in these areas. He rejects the proposed Free 
Trade Agreement with the United States and said that he would not grant renewal for the U.S. 
military base at Manta when the agreement in 2009. He has also criticized the IMF and World Bank, 
saying that they “have not been part of the solution, but part of the problem.”16 In addition, he has 
talked about restructuring the country’s debt in order to free up resources for increased social 
spending, rattling financial markets. 
 
Looking first at the IMF and World Bank, Ecuador was under IMF agreements for most of the 
years between 1983-1995, adopting many of the Fund’s recommended policies. But the country 
never recovered to even its pre-1980 level of per capita GDP. 
 
The World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development Bank supported a number of structural 
reforms in the 1990’s, including privatizations, financial liberalization, reduction of state 
employment, deregulation, and legal changes that were necessary in order to bring about these 
structural reforms.17 There is little doubt that some of these reforms helped create the instability that 
                                                 
15 See, e.g. Mark Weisbrot and David Rosnick, “A Shrinking Market: Projections for U.S. Imports,” July 2006: 
http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&Itemid=8. 
16 Gonzalo Solana, Associated Press, September 25, 2006. 
17 See, e.g. World Bank (1994), “Ecuador-Structural Adjustment Loan,” Report No. PIC1551, Washington, DC.  
Available online at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1997/ 
09/05/000009265_3971229181720/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf and Inter-American Development Bank (2003). 
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led to the crisis of the late 1990s. For example, capital account and financial liberalization spurred 
financial inflows, a credit boom, and a proliferation of dollar and offshore deposits that increased 
the vulnerability of the financial system.18  Other reforms may have been helpful, but the overall 
result was the growth failure described above, followed by an economic collapse in 1998-2000. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness of these institutions’ macroeconomic 
and structural reform policies in Ecuador, but it is difficult to see how they could be found to be 
successful before 2000. 
 
Ecuador reached a new agreement with both the IMF and the World Bank in 2000, and economic 
growth has been much better since then, as noted above. However, there was a serious dispute with 
the World Bank as to the use of oil export revenues since oil prices have risen. The Fiscal 
Responsibility and Transparency Law of 2002, which these institutions supported, created an Oil 
Stabilization Fund (FEIREP). Under this law, the Stabilization Fund, which was created with and 
received oil export revenues, was required to spend 70 percent of its revenues on purchasing (i.e. 
paying off) debt, and 10 percent for social spending. The law also limited the growth in real primary 
expenditures to 3.5 percent annually. 
 
After President Lucio Gutierrez was removed from office (April 2005) – partly as a result of protests 
against these and other economic policies that generated popular discontent – the Congress in June 
2005 approved changes that allowed for 30 percent to be spent on education and health, 10 percent 
on research and development, and some of the remainder on investment. The ceiling on primary 
expenditures was removed for infrastructure spending and raised to 5 percent for other capital 
spending. 
 
As a result of these changes, the World Bank suspended a $100 million loan to Ecuador in August 
2005.19  The government then followed up on an arrangement for a $500 million bond issue, $300 
million of which was to come from the government of Venezuela. 
 
The end result was Ecuador’s first voluntary bond placement on the international markets since 
1997, at $650 million; only $25 million was borrowed from Venezuela. However, the risk premium 
(due to previous defaults) was very high, and remains today at 5.4 percentage points above U.S. 
Treasury yields, as opposed to 2.31 for Venezuela and 3.06 for Argentina, which had the largest 
sovereign debt default ever in 2002. Ecuador barely has access to international credit markets at 
present. 
 
Table 2 shows the evolution of Ecuador’s public debt, both internal and external. As can be seen, as 
a result of the 1999 default and restructuring, and even more due to the growth of the economy and 
the use of government revenues (including oil export revenues) to pay off debt, the country’s public 
debt fell from a high of 94.5 percent of GDP in 1999 to 34 percent this year. However, debt service 
payments are still significant: interest payments are $824 million (2005), 2.2 percent of GDP, or 11.4 
percent of government expenditure. In addition, the government paid about 4.5 percent of GDP 
($1.8) in amortization for 2005.  
                                                                                                                                                             
“Financial Market Development. Support from the Inter-American Development Bank Group 1990-2002,” Washington, 
DC (http://seip.guanajuato.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=93); and 2005 
(http://seip.guanajuato.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=93). 
18 See e.g. Nazmi, Nader, “Failed Reforms and Financial Collapse in Ecuador,”Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 41 (2001), 727-735. 
19 Rafeal Correa was Finance Minister at the time and resigned later that month. 
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Correa has said that he might want to restructure the debt in order to free up resources for social 
spending and public investment. Clearly this would upset the financial markets and lower Ecuador’s 
bond credit rating. Against this risk must be weighed: (1) that Ecuador is effectively excluded from 
international credit markets in any case; (2) the potential economic growth, poverty alleviation, and 
investment in human capital that might result from these increased resources. Since Ecuador has $14 
billion of debt and not much to lose in terms of creditworthiness, the government would appear to 
be in a good bargaining position for any restructuring. Furthermore, a restructuring of international 
debt would not be likely to cause a financial crisis in the domestic economy, since the economy is 
dollarized and there would be no reason for domestic depositors to panic in the event of such a 
restructuring 
 
The government’s bargaining over a restructuring would be strengthened by the fact that it would 
almost certainly have access to credit from the government of Venezuela, which offered to loan 
$300 million to Ecuador in 2005 and has loaned $2.5 billion to Argentina and hundreds of millions 
of dollars to Bolivia. Given Ecuador’s lack of access to international credit markets, Venezuela is 
probably a likely source of credit in the near future in any case. And the government is not in 
immediate need of international credit, as Ecuador is presently running a trade surplus. So although 
Correa’s statements about possible restructuring have been met with criticism in the financial press, 
if he were to undertake negotiations for a restructuring, the government would have a very strong 
negotiating position, and the restructuring would not necessarily lead to financial instability within 
the country. 
 
Trade is another issue where the candidates differ, with Noboa supporting a proposed Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States and Correa opposed. The question may be moot, as the prospects 
for such an agreement look rather slim regardless of who is elected. Protests against the proposed 
agreement, led by indigenous groups, shut down much of the country last March. The protesters 
were opposed to increased access for U.S. agricultural products, including subsidized crops such as 
rice and corn, on Ecuadorean farmers. There were also concerns about proposed tightening of 
intellectual property restrictions relating to patented medicines, beyond what is currently agreed 
upon in the WTO’s TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), which would 
increase the price of medicines.  
 
On the other side of the equation, it is not clear what Ecuador would gain from an FTA with the 
United States, since it already has preferential access to U.S. markets through the ATPDEA (The 
Andean Trade Preferences and Drug Eradication Act) and its predecessor, the Andean Trade 
Preferences Act (ATPA).  
 
Table 3 shows U.S. imports from Ecuador since 1997. It is worth noting that three-quarters of these 
imports are oil; Ecuador is the 11th largest supplier of oil to the U.S. market. Of the remaining 25.1 
percent of imports that are not oil, 21.6 percent enters the U.S. market with preferential treatment 
from either ATPA or ATPDEA. 
 
The main advantage of an FTA would therefore be that these preferences would not have to be 
renewed. However, the near future of the ATPDEA now looks secure. 
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TABLE 3
US Imports from Ecuador by Program (1997-2006)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total ATPA 217.4 233.0 260.3 247.6 216.3 85.7 241.0 1,086.6 1,246.2 769.9
ATPDEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 84.1 1,329.2 2,386.5 3,549.5 2,270.3
Others 1,838.0 1,522.2 1,554.0 1,962.9 1,825.7 1,976.0 1,150.7 811.6 962.9 740.0
Total 2,055.4 1,755.2 1,814.3 2,210.5 2,042.0 2,145.8 2,720.9 4,284.7 5,758.7 3,780.2
Oil ATPA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 814.9 969.6 585.9
ATPDEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 84.0 1,288.9 1,520.4 2,511.5 1,638.8
Others 659.9 399.6 530.0 1,220.7 971.1 956.9 177.8 671.8 882.4 606.0
Total 659.9 399.6 530.0 1,220.7 971.1 1,041.0 1,466.7 3,007.0 4,363.5 2,830.7
Non-Oil ATPA 217.4 233.0 260.3 247.6 216.3 85.7 241.0 271.8 276.7 184.1
ATPDEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 40.3 866.1 1,038.0 631.4
Others 1,178.1 1,122.5 1,024.0 742.2 854.6 1,019.1 972.8 139.8 80.5 134.0
Total 1,395.5 1,355.5 1,284.3 989.8 1,070.9 1,104.9 1,254.2 1,277.6 1,395.2 949.5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total ATPA 10.6 13.3 14.3 11.2 10.6 4.0 8.9 25.4 21.6 20.4
ATPDEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 48.9 55.7 61.6 60.1
Others 89.4 86.7 85.7 88.8 89.4 92.1 42.3 18.9 16.7 19.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Oil ATPA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 16.8 15.5
ATPDEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 47.4 35.5 43.6 43.4
Others 32.1 22.8 29.2 55.2 47.6 44.6 6.5 15.7 15.3 16.0
Total 32.1 22.8 29.2 55.2 47.6 48.5 53.9 70.2 75.8 74.9
Non-Oil ATPA 10.6 13.3 14.3 11.2 10.6 4.0 8.9 6.3 4.8 4.9
ATPDEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 20.2 18.0 16.7
Others 57.3 64.0 56.4 33.6 41.9 47.5 35.8 3.3 1.4 3.5
Total 67.9 77.2 70.8 44.8 52.4 51.5 46.1 29.8 24.2 25.1
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission
Note: 2006 data is for the period between January and August
(US$ millions)
(% of total Imports)
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A few months ago, the ATPDEA, set to expire at the end of this year, could possibly have expired. 
Key Republicans such as Charles Grassley, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, were opposed to 
extending the preferences for Bolivia and Ecuador. Their strategy was to pressure these countries to 
agree to an FTA as the only way of maintaining their trade preferences, and possibly to influence the 
outcome of Ecuador’s presidential election. But on November 14 the White House urged Congress 
to pass the extension of the ATPDEA for all four of the countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Peru). And the election of a Democratic Congress on November 7 eliminates the ability of Grassley 
or other Republican lawmakers block the extension. At the same time it makes an FTA with 
Ecuador much less likely, even in the unlikely event that Ecuador were to reach an agreement with 
the Bush Administration. 
 
Finally, it is worth looking at whether U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, and therefore commercial relations 
would differ depending on who is elected – since Noboa has closely allied himself to U.S. policy in 
the region, and Correa has not. As explained above, trade preferences are no longer contingent on 
the outcome of this election, if indeed they were prior to November 7. More importantly, the 
general trend in recent years has been for the United States to maintain continuity of commercial 
and even aid relations with left-of-center governments in Latin America.20 This was seen in the case 
of Bolivia, where indigenous leader Evo Morales, who the Bush Administration clearly did not want 
to be president, was elected in December. So far, there has been no reduction in aid disbursements 
or commercial relations with the new government, despite some occasional unfriendly comments 
from both sides.  
 
 Even more striking, various U.S. officials used almost unprecedented economic threats in attempt 
to influence the recent Nicaraguan election of November 5. Republican Congressman Dana 
Rohrabacher warned of another economic embargo and the cutoff of vital remittances that 
Nicaraguans in the United States send home to their families. The U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua 
Paul Trivelli warned that the United States would "reevaluate relations" with Nicaragua if the former 
president Daniel Ortega were to win. U.S. officials' intervention went so far as to prompt a public 
rebuke from the Organization of American States, who asked them to stay out of the election. But 
Daniel Ortega did win, and so far none of the pre-election threats appear imminent. Since U.S. 
officials have remained silent regarding the Ecuadorian election, there is no reason to think that 
commercial or financial relations with the United States would vary with the outcome.
                                                 
20 For more on the economic and political changes that have brought about this new relationship between the United 
States and Latin America, see Weisbrot, Mark: “The End of An Era” 
http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=373. 
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Appendix 
TABLE 4
Ecuador: Quarterly Economic Indicators, 2004-2006
       I       II        III        IV        I        II        III        IV        I       II
Real GDP 7.5 12.0 7.6 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.4 5.3 5.6 …
Oil GDP 42.3 82.1 29.8 6.7 2.2 -6.0 -10.5 1.0 1.8 …
Non-oil GDP 3.0 4.7 3.7 3.1 4.4 5.9 6.5 6.3 6.0 …
Exports, FOB 1,690.6 1,987.8 2,037.7 2,036.9 2,221.7 2,473.5 2,684.8 2,720.0 3,000.4 3,228.6
Imports, CIF 1,665.4 1,913.3 2,047.9 2,245.9 2,353.8 2,532.4 2,513.3 2,887.4 2,786.3 2,915.3
International Reserves 823.7 884.7 1,179.7 1,069.6 1,025.4 1,217.0 1,568.0 1,714.2 1,859.1 1,745.9
Real effective exchange rate, consumer prices 
(average index, 2000=100) 155.0 157.3 155.7 150.4 145.8 147.6 148.9 151.0 148.8 147.5
Unemployment, total (%) 11.2 11.4 10.7 10.7 11.5 10.7 11.0 9.6 10.4 10.2
Open unemployment (%) 7.9 8.3 6.9 6.9 8.2 7.4 6.9 5.2 5.7 5.3
Employment (% employed / EAP) 88.8 88.6 89.3 89.3 88.5 89.3 89.0 90.4 89.6 89.8
Consumer prices (average, year-over-year) 3.9 3.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.9 3.8 3.3
Lending Rates (annualized percentages) 11.7 9.5 8.8 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.5 10.0 9.4 9.4
Sources: Banco Central del Ecuador (BCE)
millions of US$
2004 2005 2006
 year-over-year % change
